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Abstract
This paper repudiates Manuel Vargas’s attempt to supplant the traditional moral 
influence theory of responsibility (MIT) with his ‘agency cultivation model’ (ACM). 
By focusing on fostering responsiveness to moral considerations, ACM purports to 
avoid the chief pitfalls of MIT. However, I contend that ACM is far less distinc-
tive than it initially appears and so possesses all of MIT’s defects. I also assail Var-
gas’s counterfactual test for assessing whether a wrongdoer can respond to moral 
considerations. It is argued that the counterfactual test is epistemically redundant 
because it can only be fleshed out once we have settled the issues it is supposed to 
resolve. Moreover, it tacitly inverts the relation between freedom and responsibil-
ity—we cannot attribute free will to wrongdoers unless we have already established 
their blameworthiness. The upshot of this is that enquiries into an agent’s freedom 
are irrelevant to the ethics of holding her responsible.
Keywords Free will · Moral responsibility · Agency cultivation model · Moral 
influence theory · Consequentialism · Moral agency · Manuel Vargas · Building 
Better Beings
In an ambitious work of impressive scope, Manuel Vargas espouses the ‘agency cul-
tivation model’ of moral responsibility, which is intended to surpass traditional ver-
sions of the moral influence theory (Vargas 2013). This paper contends that Vargas’s 
model is in fact indistinguishable from the theories it is supposed to supersede, leav-
ing it vulnerable to the objections he hopes to avoid. In addition, I dispute his pro-
posed model of free will on grounds of epistemic redundancy and conceptual distor-
tion. Section 1 details Vargas’s attempt to transcend the moral influence theory by 
employing the notion of responsiveness to moral considerations. Section 2 unpacks 
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his account of moral agency to reveal the strong affinities between the agency cul-
tivation model and orthodox influence theories. Finally, Sect. 3 scrutinises the role 
that the concept of free will plays in Vargas’s account. While he ostensibly treats 
free will as a precondition for moral responsibility, I argue that his theory only per-
mits us to ascribe free will to wrongdoers if we have already ascertained that they 
are blameworthy. But once we have ascertained this, contemplation of a wrongdoer’s 
freedom becomes superfluous—the concept of free will is left with no work to do. 
Furthermore, I contend that Vargas’s abstruse counterfactual test for freedom repre-
sents a much more significant departure from folk morality than he acknowledges. 
It is suggested that the shortcomings of his conception of freedom arise because his 
methodological commitments pull him in different directions. On the one hand, he 
wants to tailor his metaphysical requirements to his goal of promoting moral agency. 
On the other, he seeks to preserve the intuition that we must be able to do otherwise 
in order to be responsible.
1  Beyond the Moral Influence Theory: The Agency Cultivation Model
In Building Better Beings, Vargas defends our ‘responsibility-characteristic prac-
tices’, which are roughly characterised by our propensity to express reactive atti-
tudes in response to good or bad conduct (Strawson 1993; Vargas 2013: 1). His 
defence centres on the ‘agency cultivation model’ (ACM), which aims to incorpo-
rate insights from the moral influence theory as traditionally conceived (MIT) and 
reasons-responsive accounts of responsibility. Crudely stated, proponents of MIT 
hold that our responsibility practices are vindicated by their tendency to strengthen 
our dispositions to behave in morally desirable ways (see Nowell-Smith 1948; Smart 
1961; Schlick 1962: ch 7; Dennett 2003, 2015; Arneson 2003; McGeer 2015). In 
contrast, reasons-responsive theories emphasise a connection between an agent’s 
responsibility and her ability to act in accordance with reason (see Wolf 1990; Wal-
lace 1994; Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Nelkin 2011; McKenna 2012). Drawing on 
each of these approaches, Vargas maintains that our responsibility practices are jus-
tified by their conduciveness to moral agency:
When we hold one another responsible, we participate in a system of prac-
tices, attitudes, and judgments that support a special kind of self-governance, 
one whereby we recogni[s]e and suitably respond to moral considerations. So, 
roughly, morali[s]ed praise and blame are justified by their effects, that is, how 
they develop and sustain a valuable form of agency, one we ordinarily have 
reason to care about. (Vargas 2013: 2) 
This focus on the impact of praise and blame means that ACM can straightforwardly 
be classified as a sort of moral influence theory, and Vargas himself claims to offer 
a rehabilitated version of MIT (Vargas 2013: 166). However, for ease of discussion, 
I shall continue to use ‘MIT’ to designate traditional moral influence theories and 
‘ACM’ to designate Vargas’s model (although we shall see that the two are far less 
distinct than they seem).
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Vargas is drawn to MIT because it offers an appealing explanation as to why our 
responsibility practices are valuable: they improve our behaviour (Vargas 2013: 
165–166). However, he also thinks it vulnerable to a number of challenges that ACM 
can avoid. For instance, because of its crude focus on positively influencing behav-
iour, MIT cannot delimit the range of responsible agents in an intuitively satisfying 
way. Since praise and blame can have desirable effects on infants and some non-
human animals, MIT must classify such beings as responsible agents (Vargas 2013: 
168). Campbell, for example, notes that ‘[i]t is quite possible, by punishing the dog 
who absconds with the succulent chops designed for its master’s luncheon, favour-
ably to influence its motives in respect of its future behaviour in like circumstances’ 
(Campbell 1951: 447). However, it seems implausible to ascribe responsible agency 
to a dog. ACM supposedly allows us to avoid such untenable conclusions. Since 
infants and most non-human animals lack the faculties required to grasp moral con-
siderations, it is inappropriate to subject them to the reactive attitudes. ACM thus 
‘permits us to draw the line in exactly the right place’ (Vargas 2013: 188).
Another drawback of MIT is that only committed consequentialists are likely to 
find it persuasive (Vargas 2013: 171). Indeed, a similar problem befalls most ethi-
cally-grounded theories of responsibility: ‘when philosophers have worn their com-
mitments to some or another normative ethical theory on their sleeve, there tends 
to be comparatively little uptake of that work internal to the subfield concerned 
with free will and moral responsibility’ (Vargas 2013: 128, fn29). Thus, rather than 
adopting a ‘partisan ethics’ approach, Vargas claims to embrace a ‘limited ethics’ 
methodology (Vargas 2013: 126–130). He states that
[G]iven the contentious nature of normative ethics, a theorist of responsibility 
should treat it as a desideratum that any proposed account of moral responsi-
bility be somewhat insulated from commitments to a specific theory of norma-
tive ethics. If we accept this methodological constraint, moral influence theo-
ries are problematic not because of consequentialism as such, but because they 
imply a commitment to a specific theory of normative ethics. (Vargas 2013: 
171)
Vargas is happy to concede that ACM is consequentialist with respect to its focus on 
outcomes. However, he thinks that one need not be a wholehearted consequential-
ist in order to embrace it. For instance, a deontologist might maintain that praise 
and blame are justified because they increase compliance with deontological norms. 
Unlike MIT, then, ACM is only ‘modestly teleological’ (Vargas 2013: 173). As Var-
gas puts it:
The present account should be understood as modular. That is, it can be inte-
grated with different ethical theories without affecting the basic justification 
for the distinctive norms of responsibility. However, how we understand vari-
ous elements of the account, and what external constraints structure and limit 
the account will vary by pairing. So, for example, if paired with consequential-
ism, we should look to the consequentialist theory of the good to inform the 
account of moral considerations. If paired with a Kantian ethical theory, moral 
considerations will presumably be understood in a different way, connected to 
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the Categorical Imperative. Since the moral influence theory is not intended to 
be an account of right action, but rather a broadly modular account of moral 
responsibility, details about how to understand the content of moral notions 
invoked by the account will be subject to variation. (Vargas 2013: 185–186, 
emphasis in original, footnote omitted)
Vargas rightly notes that the pursuit of ACM’s goals can be constrained by noncon-
sequentialist precepts (Vargas 2013: 191–193). For instance, if we wanted to incline 
a wrongdoer away from misconduct, we would enjoy greater success by extending 
our resentment to his children and other relatives.1 But this could still be deemed 
unjust if we embraced a principle of fairness that precluded blaming the innocent. 
However, we could just as easily append deontological qualifications to any version 
of MIT. Thus, these considerations give us little reason to prefer ACM’s agential 
focus to the dispositional focus of MIT. ACM and MIT are equally compatible with 
deontological side constraints.
A further shortcoming of MIT is that it cannot distinguish between genuine 
blame and blame that is feigned for the purpose of improving its target (Vargas 
2013: 168–169). Consider, for example, how our reactions would differ if our pre-
cious wallpaper was defaced by either a spiteful houseguest or a creative toddler. 
While full-blooded blame would befit the houseguest, our blame toward the tod-
dler ought to be half-hearted at most. However, MIT disallows distinctions of this 
sort. If treating children severely produces desirable effects, then we should treat 
them severely. Vargas thinks ACM can escape this concern. He maintains that genu-
ine (full-blooded) expressions of blame have an important cognitive element. They 
involve the judgment that their object satisfies the criteria for responsible agency. 
This observation cannot aid MIT because MIT will ascribe agency to many small 
children and non-human animals, as mentioned earlier. ACM, on the other hand, 
excludes such beings from the category of moral agents due to their moral and intel-
lectual limitations (Vargas 2013: 188–190).
Another powerful objection to MIT (which Vargas does not make explicit) is that 
its rationale countenances odious forms of manipulation. If we view moral improve-
ment as a desideratum, we must find some principled way to permit praise and blame 
while disallowing more sinister influences. For example, Herbert Morris famously 
recoiled at rehabilitative theories of punishment because of their consistency with 
‘the giving of an evil-tasting pill’ to produce ‘instantaneous truth or aversion to act-
ing violently’ (Morris 1981: 265–266). It is not immediately obvious that ACM can 
address such concerns. After all, it is conceivable that we may invent evil-tasting 
pills or neurosurgical techniques that generate moral epiphanies or give us the will 
power required to act on our moral values. Perhaps one day we could induce power-
ful hallucinations that provide a vivid awareness of what it feels like to be a victim 
of one’s crimes (Dolinko 1999: 359). In response, Vargas would no doubt point out 
that deontological side constraints could prohibit such practices. However, this retort 
1 I have borrowed this example from Boonin (2008: ch 2).
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could equally well be made by proponents of MIT. Moreover, the tenability of this 
response is highly questionable, as will become clear in Sect. 2.
Vargas considers three more objections to MIT that I will not dwell on at any 
length. This is because Vargas’s rejoinders to them can just as easily be made by 
supporters of MIT. (Indeed, Vargas himself does not offer these as reasons to prefer 
ACM over MIT.) My chief purpose in the next section is to repudiate the claim that 
ACM represents a meaningful departure from MIT. Since the following rejoinders 
do not purport to establish ACM’s superiority, they can be dispensed with briefly.
First, Vargas notes that MIT is often alleged to conflate ‘being responsible with 
judgments about the appropriateness of holding responsible’ (Vargas 2013: 168). 
According to MIT, an agent is responsible just in case praising or blaming her will 
produce certain desirable effects. But, the objection runs, an agent can be respon-
sible even though it would be inappropriate to hold her responsible. For instance, 
it could be improper to hold somebody responsible for her first impolitic remark, 
even though she is responsible for that remark (Vargas 2013: 169). Like proponents 
of MIT, Vargas accepts that influenceability is the mark of responsibility, but notes 
that factors external to ACM, such as ‘considerations of justice, benevolence, [and] 
prudence’ could render it inappropriate to hold someone responsible (Vargas 2013: 
190). Given the discussions in the last few paragraphs, it should be immediately 
obvious that this line of reasoning could also be adopted by MIT’s defenders.
The second objection is that MIT does not account for the phenomenology of 
holding others responsible (Vargas 2013: 169). As PF Strawson notes, the reactive 
attitudes express ‘how much we actually mind, how much it matters to us, whether 
the actions of other people—and particularly of some other people—reflect attitudes 
towards us of goodwill, affection, or esteem on the one hand or contempt, indiffer-
ence, or malevolence on the other’ (Strawson 1993: 49). We thump the table with 
anger when a colleague will not repay a debt; we express teary-eyed gratitude to 
friends who console us in times of need. But MIT merely recommends that we 
behave as though we feel such emotions—it is indifferent about whether we actu-
ally experience them. It may, for instance, commend the outward appearance of out-
rage when one is really in a state of perfect equanimity. In other words, MIT can-
not explain why genuine reactive attitudes are preferable to hollow imitations. In 
response to this concern, Vargas observes that most instances of praise and blame 
reflect genuine emotions and he is thankful this is so. After all, if we were not ‘inter-
personally engaged’, our inclinations to hold others accountable would decrease 
markedly (Vargas 2013: 193). Moreover, ACM does not prescribe that each instance 
of praise and blame must be informed by cold, forward-looking calculations. If the 
interpersonal engagements that drive our responsibility practices are generally effi-
cacious (that is, if they are sufficiently conducive to moral considerations respon-
siveness), then we are permitted to preserve them without having to reflect much 
about their utility in particular instances (Vargas 2013: 193–194). This line of rea-
soning, whatever its merits, is clearly compatible with MIT and so I will say nothing 
more of it here.
Finally, the third objection is that MIT’s forward-looking focus mischaracterises our 
responsibility practices (Vargas 2013: 169–170). Consider, for example, the ‘Butcher 
of Lyon’ Klaus Barbie, a Nazi war criminal who was not convicted until 1987. Upon 
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learning of how Barbie tortured children and flayed people alive, nearly all of us will 
feel indignation toward him. But our indignation is for what he has done rather than 
what he will do. We might hope that our opprobrium will deter would-be war crimi-
nals, but this is not our reason for expressing it. Some ascriptions of responsibility are, 
as Gerald Dworkin remarks, ‘not oriented toward the future but are, so to speak, for the 
record’ (Dworkin 1986: 424). Vargas’s response to this issue overlaps significantly with 
his response to the previous one. He begins by endorsing Strawson’s observation that 
the reactive attitudes reflect judgments about the personal qualities others have exhib-
ited in their actions. With this in mind, Vargas claims:
Assuming a good will is at least sometimes reflective of moral considerations, it 
is reasonable to think that learning to track a good will can play a role in learning 
to track moral considerations. Perhaps more importantly, our reactions of grati-
tude can signal that we recogni[s]e that other agents are responding to what we 
regard as appropriately agency-guiding considerations. Of course, sometimes 
these considerations are extra- or non-moral, but inasmuch as gratitude reliably 
reflects appreciation of moral considerations-governed agency too, gratitude has 
all the license we can hope for. Similar remarks hold for other backward-look-
ing attitudes: as long as they plausibly play a role in the social and intrapersonal 
economy of governance by moral considerations, there is no objection here. (Var-
gas 2013: 194)
In other words, backward-looking ascriptions of responsibility are justifiable because 
they can further the moral development of both oneself and others. Like Vargas’s previ-
ous riposte, it is obvious that this response can be made in defence of MIT. However, a 
couple of things are worth noting. First, for someone trying to make friends in diverse 
quarters, Vargas’s claim that a future-oriented justification of our practices is all ‘we 
can hope for’ is sweepingly dismissive. Second, this claim is worlds apart from one of 
his opening assertions that ‘we are beings for whom morali[s]ed praise and blame make 
sense, partly because of the effects of praise and blame’ (Vargas 2013: 3–4, emphasis 
added). This initial suggestion of a rich justification that draws only in part on conse-
quentialist considerations belies the subsequent claim that a future-oriented rationale is 
the only game in town.
Although some will be repelled by Vargas’s heavy reliance on forward-looking con-
cerns, ACM may appear to constitute a significant advancement beyond MIT. Indeed, 
one reviewer commends his ‘admirable job of showing how [ACM] is largely immune 
to the sorts of worries thought to plague [MIT]’ (Capes 2016: 248). However, such 
praise is misplaced. Once we have unpacked Vargas’s conception of moral agency in 
the next section, we shall see that it is no different to MIT’s notion of being disposed to 
behave morally.
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2  Responsiveness to Moral Considerations: A Distinction Without 
a Difference
In order to fully appreciate ACM’s failure to move beyond MIT, we should first 
familiarise ourselves with Vargas’s account of how praise and blame can promote 
moral agency. He begins by noting that norms are often internalised as a result of 
sustained exposure to external reasons for compliance (Vargas 2013: 175–177). The 
reactive attitudes and their associated behaviours ‘initially work by providing exter-
nal motivation for agents to track moral considerations and regulate their behavio[u]
r in light of them’ (Vargas 2013: 175).2 However, ‘norms for which we start off hav-
ing only external motivations to obey will, under many conditions, go on to become 
internali[s]ed. When that happens, the norms are experienced as intrinsically moti-
vating’ (Vargas 2013: 175). External motivation is left undefined but we might stip-
ulate the following:
External Motivation A person is externally motivated to ϕ (where ‘ϕ’ repre-
sents adherence to some norm) to the extent that: (1) he is in fact motivated to 
ϕ; and (2) his motivation to ϕ is dependent upon his expectation that certain 
beneficial or adverse personal consequences will respectively follow from his 
either ϕing or not ϕing.
For instance, an atheist politician may be motivated to attend church in order to win 
religious votes. Similarly, a misanthropic dog walker may be motivated to pick up 
her pet’s droppings in order to avoid a fine. The politician expects beneficial conse-
quences from compliance; the dog walker expects adverse consequences from non-
compliance. Intrinsic motivation seems to be the inverse of external motivation: non-
prudential motivation to comply with some norm. Vargas emphasises that ‘norms of 
praise and blame can come to structure the deliberations of agents even when actual 
expressions of praise and blame are unlikely or absent’ (Vargas 2013: 175). He also 
cites a well-known piece about internalisation by Sripada and Stich (2006). These 
authors state that ‘according to the internali[s]ation hypothesis, individuals exhibit a 
characteristic style of motivation in which the individual intrinsically values compli-
ance with moral rules even when there is no possibility of sanction from an external 
source’ (Sripada and Stich 2006: 285–286). They also note that intrinsically moti-
vated people are ‘disposed to comply with norms even when there is little prospect 
for instrumental gain, future reciprocation, or enhanced reputation, and when the 
chance of being detected for failing to comply with the norm is very small’ (Sripada 
and Stich 2006: 285). Hence, it seems that an individual will have internalised some 
norm to the extent that he is intrinsically motivated to comply with that norm. And 
with respect to intrinsic motivation, we might stipulate the following:
2 What Vargas should be saying here is that praise and blame provide external motivation for tracking 
other people’s convictions about moral considerations. This slip is corrected later, where he states that 
‘morali[s]ed blame tends to push the target’s attention to considerations that others perceive as morally 
salient’ (Vargas 2013: 198, emphasis added).
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Intrinsic Motivation A person is intrinsically motivated to ϕ (where ‘ϕ’ 
represents adherence to some norm) to the extent that: (1) he is in fact moti-
vated to ϕ; and (2) his motivation to ϕ is not dependent upon his expecta-
tion that certain beneficial or adverse personal consequences will respec-
tively follow from his either ϕing or not ϕing.
There are obviously multiple routes to intrinsic motivation. One person may be 
intrinsically motivated to ϕ as a result of sustained moral reflection, another as a 
result of unthinking conventionalism. The important point is that the motivation 
is not presently tied to external incentives (though it may have been at one point). 
None of this entails that an agent cannot be both intrinsically motivated to ϕ and 
externally motivated to ϕ (Sripada and Stich 2006: 285). For example, our dog 
walker could be motivated by both other-regarding and prudential concerns, and 
each motivation may be individually sufficient to lead to action. But how does 
Vargas connect intrinsic motivation and responsiveness to moral considerations? 
I shall encapsulate that connection in one final stipulation, in support of which I 
will adduce several passages from Vargas.
Responsiveness to Moral Considerations A person is responsive to some 
moral consideration M to the extent that he is intrinsically motivated to act 
in accordance with M.
Curiously, Vargas immediately abandons the language of intrinsic motivation 
after his brief discussion of norm internalisation, and he mentions internalisa-
tion only once more—in a subsequent chapter where he recommends adjusting 
our responsibility practices in light of ‘the need of agents to internali[s]e norms 
of action for moral considerations’ (Vargas 2013: 214). He states that a moral 
consideration is ‘a consideration with moral significance such that, were one to 
deliberate about what to do, it ought to play a role in those deliberations’ (Vargas 
2013: 203). Talk of considerations is preferred over that of reasons because it 
avoids ‘the suggestion of an account of responsible agency that is particularly 
bound up in a rationalistic conception of agency’ (Vargas 2013: 203). This is not 
to deny the moral agency of Spock-like figures who act on the basis of a cool and 
rational perception of moral reasons. Rather, it is to affirm the moral agency of 
those who act in a far less deliberative manner. As Vargas states: ‘What I have 
in mind by moral considerations includes things that we recogni[s]e as reason[s] 
in as fully rationalistic a sense as you like, but also things that are largely or per-
haps exclusively affective’ (Vargas 2013: 203, fn6). At later junctures, we find 
two more important passages:
[S]ensitivity to moral considerations may involve susceptibility to a nag-
ging feeling, reacting to a dim hope, being able to imagine the situation of 
another, or attending to an inarticulate, largely inchoate suspicion about 
things. Just how any of this happens may vary from person to person and 
from situation to situation. (Vargas 2013: 208–209)
And:
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[D]etection of moral considerations need not be conscious, and the agent need 
not recogni[s]e that it is a moral consideration qua moral consideration that is 
moving him or her to act. Detection of moral considerations amounts to aware-
ness of moral considerations, and that awareness need not be conscious or 
even necessarily explicable by the agent. (Vargas 2013: 217)
These remarks make it clear that Vargas embraces a highly capacious understand-
ing of responsiveness to moral considerations. Indeed, it even allows us to describe 
some moral sceptics as morally responsive. Consider, for example, a philanthropic 
nihilist whose charitable endeavours result from an inner drive to help the unfor-
tunate. Clearly, she would reject any claim that she is motivated by moral concern. 
However, for Vargas, there is no cognitive requirement that she construe her behav-
iour as moral in nature. It is enough that she is (unwittingly) acting in accordance 
with a moral standard on the basis of a ‘nagging feeling’. After all, moral consider-
ations-responsiveness can be ‘exclusively affective’. These reflections make it diffi-
cult to see any difference between being intrinsically motivated to act in accordance 
with some moral consideration and being responsive to that moral consideration. 
Moreover, Vargas’s lengthy discussion of how praise and blame promote norm inter-
nalisation would be superfluous if he did not see an important connection between 
intrinsic motivation and moral considerations-responsiveness. Section 2.2 will argue 
that Vargas’s conception of moral agency is so commodious that his agency culti-
vation model is indistinguishable from the moral influence theory. But first, let us 
query whether paradigmatic examples of ACM in action can really be said to foster 
moral agency.
2.1  Taking the ‘Agency’ out of Moral Agency
Contemplation of two hypotheticals allows us to see that ACM is not really about 
the promotion of moral agency. First, imagine the following scenario:
John is born into a religiously conservative society that strongly denounces 
homosexuality. During his adolescence, he begins to experience homosexual 
urges. However, whenever such impulses arise, he is struck by fears of hell-
fire and ostracism. As a result, John develops an aversion so visceral that he 
never acts on his homosexual desires. With time, his urges no longer evoke 
terror, but the aversion remains powerful. Indeed, John comes to regard homo-
sexuality as he does incest—as something he just knows to be deeply immoral. 
Although John is strongly committed to this view, he lacks the reflective fac-
ulties required to provide a compelling rationale for it. When asked to why 
homosexuality is wrong, he merely falls into the tautology of replying: ‘It just 
is!’
What, on Vargas’s account, are we to make of John’s development? Has his society 
cultivated within him a ‘valuable form of agency’? (Vargas 2013: 2) Initially, his 
motivation to comply with the norm precluding homosexuality is entirely external. 
He is driven only by a fear of suffering unpalatable personal consequences (hellfire 
and ostracism). But his motivation eventually becomes intrinsic: even when external 
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reasons for compliance do not present themselves, John remains robustly indisposed 
to perform homosexual acts. Further, his aversion translates into a moral belief that 
homosexual acts are wicked. He may find this belief scarcely explicable, but, as we 
have seen, Vargas does not place a strong cognitive requirement on moral agency. 
Must Vargas conclude that John’s responsiveness to moral considerations has been 
enhanced? Of course not—the norm John has internalised carries no genuine moral 
force. Consensual intercourse between same-sex adults is morally permissible. But 
now consider a parallel scenario:
Fred is born into a liberal society that detests racism. At an early age, he expe-
riences racist impulses which manifest themselves through cruel and deroga-
tory behaviour. Such behaviour brings about various personal costs for Fred. 
His parents confiscate his tablet computer; his teacher secludes him in the 
naughty corner; his friends are not allowed to play with him. Initially, his 
prejudice remains undiminished but Fred certainly learns to think twice before 
giving expression to it. After several years of self-policing, he develops a deep 
antipathy toward his intolerance. When prejudicial sentiments enter his mind, 
he no longer imagines the cost of acting on them but he still feels a strong 
urge to quash them. This aversion convinces Fred of the iniquity of racism. But 
when asked why members of other races should be treated equally, he can say 
little more than ‘They just should!’
In Fred’s case, a genuine moral norm has been internalised, and so Vargas may be 
willing to concede that his moral agency has been enhanced. However, we should be 
reluctant to take this view. Since Fred’s process of internalisation was analogous to 
John’s, Fred remains unworthy of the label moral agent. The views of both men are 
not the products of careful reflection; instead, they result from unthinking capitula-
tion to social pressures. Fred, of course, at least had the good fortune to swallow 
a true belief and we may very well be glad of this. However, under different cir-
cumstances, he could come to endorse far more odious norms. After a few years 
with the Westboro Baptist Church, we might find him chanting vulgar mantras while 
picketing the funerals of fallen soldiers. Let us suppose that almost all of the moral 
precepts Fred endorses are correct and have been internalised through similar social 
processes. Because he is unwaveringly disposed to act morally, Vargas must now 
view Fred as a paradigm of moral agency. However, the opposite conclusion is more 
apposite. There is an inverse relationship between moral agency and the susceptibil-
ity of one’s moral convictions to external forces. Fred is not a moral agent; he is 
a moral drifter—a mere receptacle of social mores. The fact his moral convictions 
happen to be true does not make him a moral agent.
To avoid this line of criticism, Vargas might append stronger cognitive require-
ments to his conception of agency. For example, he could take Ronald Dworkin’s 
view that moral agency involves subjecting one’s moral convictions to careful scru-
tiny in light of one’s other moral convictions, empirical beliefs, the requirements of 
logic, and so on (Dworkin 2011: ch 6). However, this variety of agency is highly 
demanding. It requires mental fortitude, intelligence, and creativity. And we can-
not take it for granted that these characteristics could be enhanced meaningfully by 
exposure to praise and blame. Hence, if Vargas adopted a Dworkinian conception 
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of agency, his claim that our responsibility practices are effective at fostering moral 
agency would lose much of its plausibility. At the very least, it would require vastly 
greater empirical substantiation than he provides. He therefore appears to face the 
following problem: the richer the conception of agency employed, the less tenable 
ACM becomes. The upshot of this is not that we should withhold praise and blame 
from people like John and Fred—there are obviously good reasons for holding them 
accountable. However, we should not conclude that doing so promotes their moral 
agency. In other words, agency cultivation model is a misnomer. But it is no innocu-
ous misnomer. This is not an issue of mere semantics. After all, it is Vargas’s talk of 
moral agency which gives plausibility to his claim to have transcended traditional 
versions of the moral influence theory. Now that we have unpacked his account, we 
are well poised to expose the falsity of this claim.
2.2  The Objections to MIT Revisited
Recall the first objection discussed in Sect. 1: namely, that MIT cannot delimit the 
range of responsible agents in an intuitively satisfying manner. Vargas uses the lan-
guage of moral agency to deflect this objection. He tells us that his focus on agency 
allows him to ‘draw the line [between responsible and non-responsible agents] 
in exactly the right place’ (Vargas 2013: 188). However, his conception of moral 
agency is so diluted that ACM would draw the line exactly where MIT does. For 
Vargas, responding to moral considerations amounts to little more than acting mor-
ally without regard to prudential concerns. Indeed, as an example of responding to 
moral requirements, Vargas cites ‘[b]eing able to perceive when a quiet friend is 
in need of consolation’ (Vargas 2013: 208). However, this ability is possessed by 
many small children and non-human animals, as all parents and dog-owners know. 
Indeed, the renowned primatologist Jane Goodall has observed chimpanzees and 
bonobos soothing defeated friends, punishing delinquents, and adopting orphaned 
infants (Goodall 2010). Even a rat will liberate and share food with a caged com-
panion (Bartal et  al. 2011).3 Infants aged between 18 and 30 months can respond 
to distress in others by sharing toys, providing hugs, and seeking the help of adults 
(Zahn-Waxler et al. 1979). Thus, contrary to what Vargas claims, ACM will in fact 
ascribe responsible agency to beings that he considers intuitively unresponsible. Far 
from establishing that ACM delimits the range of responsible agents in a more sat-
isfactory manner than does MIT, Vargas fails to establish that ACM delimits that 
range differently at all.
Because the respective classes of responsible agents under MIT and ACM are 
more or less coextensive, Vargas’s attempt to distinguish moral and non-moral 
forms of influence is also unpersuasive. Vargas, it should be remembered, claims 
that wholehearted ascriptions of responsibility are reserved only for those we judge 
to fall within the class of responsible agents. However, by inadvertently locating 
many children and non-human animals within that class, he has committed himself 
3 I owe this reference and the previous one to Churchland (2019: 166).
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to the view that such beings are in fact apt candidates of wholehearted resentment 
and indignation. A toddler might not be a Dworkinian agent, but we can surely dis-
incline her from drawing on the walls through stern disapprobation. Vargas has not 
explained why ACM provides grounds for mollifying our responses to beings who 
appear to lack full responsibility.
Now let us turn to MIT’s ‘partisan ethics’ problem. While only consequential-
ists are drawn to MIT, Vargas thinks theorists of sundry ethical commitments can 
readily embrace ACM. One reason for this is that ACM can be combined with 
deontological precepts that constrain its pursuit of ‘moral agency’. In Sect. 1, it was 
quickly pointed out that this is also true of MIT. I also promised to show that even a 
side-constrained version of ACM would not be agreeable to most nonconsequential-
ists. Before supporting this claim, I wish to defend Vargas against the objection that 
a society which adhered to ACM would violate the second formulation of Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative: ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own per-
son or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely 
as a means’ (Kant 1998: 38, emphasis removed). Nadine Elzein makes this com-
plaint, stating that  ‘it is not easy to justify Vargas’s [account] without abandoning 
the Kantian principle that prohibits treating any person merely as a means’ (Elzein 
2013: 212). This charge is often made against the deterrence-oriented rationale for 
punishment. Despite being a staunch deontologist, Matthew Kramer has defended 
the deterrence-oriented rationale for capital punishment against such allegations 
(Kramer 2011: 29–30).4 His reasoning is echoed in my rebuttal of Elzein.
There are obvious reasons to think that ACM contravenes Kant’s second formu-
lation. As Elzein points out, ACM recommends that we impose unpleasant experi-
ences on people for the benefit of others. It tells us to blame a wrongdoer so that 
society profits from his moral improvement. But in doing so, we would be using him 
as a mere instrument in the pursuit of the public good (Elzein 2013: 221–223). It is 
indisputable that ACM offers instrumental reasons to hold others responsible. How-
ever, it would be a mistake to think that any responsibility system informed by ACM 
would use people solely as a means.
ACM is immune to the mere means objection because it offers a system-level jus-
tification of our responsibility practices. It seeks to propagate responsibility norms 
that strengthen our dispositions to behave morally. Vargas can happily concede that 
anyone blamed under these norms would be used as a means to an end. However, 
such a person would also have enjoyed the benefits secured by the system’s previous 
ascriptions of responsibility. She would have profited from the increased security 
that comes with living in a more moral society—a society less disposed toward acts 
of violence and dishonesty. Her interests would have been advanced by the reduced 
probability of iniquitous acts occurring and undermining her own ends. Hence, the 
responsibility system under which she was blamed would not have treated her as 
a mere tool to promote the ends of others. It would have respected her as a person 
whose projects ought to be protected. Because ACM promotes an end that redounds 
4 Kramer cites Jeffrey Reiman and Dan Markel as notable retributivists who have defended the deter-
rence-oriented rationale for capital punishment against the ‘mere means’ objection.
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to the benefit of everyone—including those it deems blameworthy—it does not con-
flict with Kant’s stricture in the second formulation.
Nonetheless, there are strong reasons to doubt that many deontologists would 
be willing to embrace ACM. One reason pertains to the restricted role that the 
idea of basic desert plays within Vargas’s theory. This idea is captured by Derk 
Pereboom in the following passage:
For an agent to be morally responsible for an action in this [the basic desert] 
sense is for it to be hers in such a way that she would deserve to be blamed 
if she understood that it was morally wrong, and she would deserve to be 
praised if she understood that it was morally exemplary. The desert at issue 
here is basic in the sense that the agent would deserve to be blamed or 
praised just because she has performed the action, given an understanding 
of its moral status, and not, for example, merely by virtue of consequential-
ist or contractualist considerations. (Pereboom 2014: 2)
Given ACM’s expressly forward-looking concerns, one might be surprised to 
learn that Vargas thinks the backward-looking notion of desert can be justified 
by ACM. After all, he repeatedly emphasises that we should endorse norms of 
responsibility that are optimal for fostering moral agency in the future. However, 
he also suggests this goal could be advanced if we adopted a norm of appor-
tioning praise and blame according to basic desert (Vargas 2013: ch 8, 2015). 
ACM gives us ‘reason to participate in retrosert [i.e. backward-looking, desert-
based] practices because of the contributions of such practices and judgments in 
our becoming better beings’ (Vargas 2015: 2668). Vargas acknowledges that this 
observation is unlikely to placate theorists who want their desert to be backward-
looking all the way down. However, he claims that ACM at least has the virtue of 
providing some normative basis for desert: ‘For those who like their desert unen-
cumbered by larger justificatory support, [this] picture of desert… does not look 
like a picture of desert at all’ (Vargas 2015: 2666). However, what those who 
attach importance to basic desert typically want is not an account that is utterly 
devoid of theoretical support, but an account that is not grounded in a consequen-
tialist morality. This is encapsulated in the retributivism of Michael Moore:
Retributivism… is the view that punishment is justified by the desert of the 
offender. The good that is achieved by punishing… has nothing to do with 
future states of affairs, such as the prevention of crime or the maintenance 
of social cohesion. Rather, the good that punishment achieves is that some-
one who deserves it gets it. (Moore 1997: 87, emphasis added)
Philosophers of this ilk will not be impressed by Vargas’s attempt to ground 
basic desert in consequentialist reasoning. Of course, such theorists could well 
be ethically mistaken. However, this is beside the point. The key issue here is 
whether ACM can be readily adopted by theorists in diverse quarters. In failing 
to allow any justificatory role for basic desert, Vargas has already alienated a fair 
portion of nonconsequentialists.
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Furthermore, many deontologists who do not care much for basic desert will 
find ACM’s future-oriented concerns unpalatable. Consider, for instance, what a 
Kantian would have to maintain if she embraced ACM. She could happily accept 
that the reactive attitudes help us to internalise moral norms. However, she could 
not seriously claim that they make us internalise those norms for the right rea-
sons. It would be incredible to think that praise and blame could improve our 
abilities to derive moral precepts from the Categorical Imperative. But once she 
has conceded this much, the Kantian’s endorsement of ACM becomes vulnerable 
to a complaint famously made by Hegel. Offering people external incentives to 
comply with morality is like ‘raising one’s stick at a dog’ to improve its behav-
iour (Hegel 1991: 125).
Moreover, once a deontologist has adopted this understanding of moral respon-
sibility, she will find herself having to explain why it is appropriate to manipulate 
people through praise and blame but not through more rebarbative methods like 
brainwashing and the giving of evil-tasting pills. She might claim that these methods 
fail to respect the wrongdoer’s right to self-directed agency in a way that praise and 
blame do not. For instance, when we blame someone for a wrongful act, it remains 
open for them to perform similar acts in the future. In contrast, such acts could be 
permanently foreclosed by brainwashing and mind-altering pills. This line of reason-
ing is, however, untenable. First of all, the reactive attitudes could produce similarly 
strong dispositional changes in some people. Second, it is possible to imagine milder 
forms of brainwashing and pill-giving that generate strong but not incapacitating 
aversions. These methods would not fall afoul of the self-directed agency require-
ment as understood here. Hence, it is not obvious that deontologists can consistently 
embrace ACM while repudiating the manipulative techniques just discussed.
The strongest reason to think that most deontologists would disavow ACM is that 
it seems to require them to renounce their deontology. Vargas invites them to adopt 
ACM by appealing to the utility of praise and blame in promoting compliance with 
deontological norms. In doing so, he is suggesting that compliance with deonto-
logical duties be treated as an intrinsic good that ought to be maximised. However, 
anyone who takes this maximising view is aptly characterised not as a deontologist 
but as what Nozick calls a ‘utilitarian of rights’ (Nozick 1974: 30). On this view, 
minimising duty violations (thereby protecting the rights which are correlative to 
those duties) ‘merely would replace the total happiness as the relevant end state in 
the utilitarian structure’ (Nozick 1974: 28, emphasis removed).5 Nozick claims that 
this understanding would distort the function of rights in governing our actions. 
Rights do not specify end states to be pursued; rather, they ‘express the inviolabil-
ity of others’ by constraining what we may do to them (Nozick 1974: 28, 29, 32). 
Rights ‘reflect the fact that no moral balancing act can take place among us; there is 
5 In this paragraph, I take for granted the view of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld that rights and duties are 
correlative. As put by Kramer, who defends this position at length, rights and duties are mutually entail-
ing in that ‘each is the other from a different perspective, in much the same way that an upward slope 
viewed from below is a downward slope viewed from above’ (Kramer 1998: 24, 24–60). Those inclined 
to dissent from this view can instead see Vargas as offering a utilitarianism of duties that deontologists 
would find equally disagreeable.
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no moral outweighing of one of our lives by others so as to lead to a greater overall 
social good’ (Nozick 1974: 33, emphasis in original). There is no need to assess 
Nozick’s conception of rights here. The important point is that it reflects a paradigm 
of deontological ethics. Any deontologist who wished to embrace ACM would have 
to forsake the understanding of rights that is characteristic of deontology. For some, 
ACM may be sufficiently alluring to induce this shift, but for most it will not. Most 
deontologists will wish to remain deontologists.
The majority of virtue ethicists would also find Vargas’s model unsavoury, not-
withstanding their concern about cultivating morally desirable characteristics. This 
is because modern proponents of virtue ethics usually consider virtues to involve 
moral understanding rather than mere temperaments.6 An honest person, for exam-
ple, is not just someone who is inclined to represent her mental states accurately. 
Indeed, too much of this could bring her into the realm of vice. Rather, an honest 
person tells the truth because she appreciates the value of doing so. As the editors of 
a recent collection on virtue ethics note, ‘in order for a moral character trait to be a 
virtue, it must not only be in accord with the relevant moral norms, but the disposi-
tion must also be informed by proper reasoning about the matter at hand’ (Timpe 
and Boyd 2014: 7). Hence, the tolerant moral drifter who appeared in the previous 
subsection would not be regarded as virtuous even if his behaviour happened to be 
exemplary. As with deontologists, then, Vargas will struggle to win over any virtue 
ethicists in the absence of strong evidence that praise and blame conduce to sound 
moral reasoning.
This section’s broad line of reasoning can be captured by an autobiographical 
analogy. As a child, I would often wedge a piece of cardboard into my bicycle so 
that it intersected with the spokes on one of the wheels. When cycling, this resulted 
in a vibrating sound that (to the fertile imagination of a child) resembled an engine, 
enabling me to pretend I was riding a motorcycle. Alas, I was just riding a bicy-
cle. This anecdote helps to underscore the role that moral agency plays in Vargas’s 
account. He has taken a bicycle (MIT), inserted a piece of cardboard (the notion 
of moral agency), and is claiming to ride a motorcycle (ACM). But the sound of 
ACM’s revving engine is sustained by nothing more than a flimsy piece of card-
board. On closer inspection, we can see that Vargas is riding the same model as his 
predecessors. His account does not merely share MIT’s shortcomings; it just is MIT.
3  Free Will and Agency Cultivation
Having exposed Vargas’s failure to advance beyond MIT, I now wish to turn my 
attention to his proposed test for responsible agency. Given ACM’s aims, ‘it only 
makes sense to demand adherence to norms of praise and blame if one has the 
capacity to regulate one’s conduct in light of moral considerations’ (Vargas 2013: 
197). To aid our assessment of which wrongdoers possess this capacity, Vargas 
proposes a rather abstruse counterfactual test. This final section begins by briefly 
6 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for reminding me of this.
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recounting his test for responsible agency, along with some of the motivations for 
construing it as he does. I then examine the test in greater detail and home in on 
its free will condition. In short, Vargas maintains that whenever some agent S has 
failed to respond to some moral consideration M, S had the free will to respond to 
M if and only if S would have responded to M in a suitable proportion of relevantly 
similar worlds. His guidance on how to understand the proportionality and similar-
ity requirements leaves much to the reader’s imagination, and so I begin by trying to 
follow his recipe for making these notions more precise. After doing so, I conclude 
that we can only determine whether S satisfies Vargas’s counterfactual test if we 
already know whether ACM gives us good reasons to hold people like S responsible. 
But once we possess such knowledge, any enquiry into how S would have behaved 
in various alternative worlds becomes superfluous—there is no longer any need to 
contemplate any counterfactuals. I suggest that this defect arises because Vargas 
wants his account of free will to perform two quite different roles. First, he wants it 
to reliably pick out agents who are likely to be positively influenced by blame. Sec-
ond, he wants it to capture the intuition that an agent must be able to do other than 
he does in order to be blameworthy.
3.1  Testing for Responsible Agency
How can we tell whether an individual possesses the capacity to act on the basis 
of moral considerations? Vargas’s answer is located within a two-part test that sets 
out the criteria for responsible agency. The test consists of a self-directed agency 
requirement and a free will requirement, and these broadly correspond to Fischer 
and Ravizza’s epistemic and control conditions (Fischer and Ravizza 1998). Self-
directed agency involves properties like ‘beliefs, desires, means-end reasoning, the 
ability to formulate and execute action plans, and the presence of ordinary epistemic 
abilities’ (Vargas 2013: 213, footnote omitted). But the capacity to respond to moral 
considerations is located within the free will condition, and it is this condition that 
Vargas is primarily concerned to explicate. Before we unpack this requirement, some 
preliminaries are in order. First, it should be borne in mind that Vargas’s concep-
tion of free will is explicitly tied to his concerns about cultivating moral agency. He 
wants to develop an account of free will which, if widely used to guide ascriptions 
of responsibility, would strongly conduce to moral considerations-responsiveness. 
In his own words, ‘the powers that constitute free will are those that suffice to sup-
port morali[s]ed praising and blaming practices, so that such practices increase our 
acting on moral considerations and expand the contexts in which we do so’ (Vargas 
2013: 213). He emphasises this further by stating that the metaphysics of his account 
are ‘structured throughout by the normative concerns that undergird our interest in 
responsibility’ (Vargas 2013: 215).7 This strategy brings to mind Dennett’s approv-
ing summation of Stephen White’s methodology: ‘Don’t try to use metaphysics to 
7 The following assertion from McGeer is therefore puzzling: ‘the features that make for responsibility 
[on Vargas’s account] are ontologically prior to, and conceptually independent of their role in making 
agents fit or appropriate targets of the responsibility system’ (McGeer 2015: 2636, emphasis in original). 
Vargas himself has taken exception to this claim (Vargas 2015: 2676).
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ground ethics… put it the other way around: Use ethics to fix what we should mean 
by our ‘metaphysical’ criterion’ (White 1991: ch 8; Dennett 2003: 297).
Vargas clearly wants his test to identify people who are amenable to the reac-
tive attitudes. However, he does not recommend that we try to calculate the conse-
quences of each particular instance of praise and blame. Rather, he favours a set of 
responsibility norms that are generally efficacious. Any such system of norms will 
inevitably ascribe free will to people whose behaviour is immune to or even exacer-
bated by praise or blame (Vargas 2013: 177–181). As Vargas states:
[T]here may be instances where my gratitude or indignation may fail to influ-
ence anyone in the proper fashion. Nonetheless, my gratitude (or indignation) 
can have an appropriate role, internal to a system of moral influence, because 
the prevalence of such attitudes and corresponding practices contributes to 
the efficacy and stability of the responsibility system over time. (Vargas 2013: 
177, footnote omitted)
He goes on to state: ‘At a general level, the norms of praise and blame just are those 
that are most effective at collectively influencing agents in the appropriate way’ 
(Vargas 2013: 180). With these matters in mind, we can now turn to Vargas’s two-
part test for responsible agency, which takes the following form:
An agent S is a responsible agent with respect to considerations of type M in 
circumstances C if S possesses a suite of basic agential capacities implicated in 
effective self-directed agency (including, for example, beliefs, desires, intentions, 
instrumental reasoning, and generally reliable beliefs about the world and the conse-
quences of action) and is also possessed of the relevant capacity for (A) detection of 
suitable moral considerations M in C and (B) self-governance with respect to M in 
C. Conditions (A) and (B) are to be understood in the following ways:
(A) The capacity for detection of the relevant moral considerations obtains when: 
 (i) S actually detects moral considerations of type M in C that are pertinent 
to actions available to S or
 (ii) in those possible worlds where S is in a context relevantly similar to C, 
and moral considerations of type M are present in those contexts, in a 
suitable proportion of those worlds S successfully detects those consid-
erations.
(B) The capacity for volitional control, or self-governance with respect to the rel-
evant moral considerations M in circumstances C obtains when either 
 (i) S is, in light of awareness of M in C, motivated to accordingly pursue 
courses of action for which M counts in favo[u]r, and to avoid courses of 
action disfavo[u]red by M or
 (ii) when S is not so motivated, in a suitable proportion of those worlds where 
S is in a context relevantly similar to C. 
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(a) S detects moral considerations of type M, and
(b) in virtue of detecting M considerations, S acquires the motivation to 
act accordingly, and
(c) S successfully acts accordingly (Vargas 2013: 213–214).
For Vargas, an agent has free will if and only if conditions (A) and (B) are jointly 
satisfied.8 As he acknowledges, questions immediately arise about how to flesh out the 
proportionality and similarity requirements of (A.ii) and (B.ii). Just how similar must 
a possible world be to our own in order to qualify as relevantly similar? And what 
proportion of relevantly similar worlds is a suitable proportion? Rather than propos-
ing that we adopt rigid understandings of these concepts, Vargas suggests that we cash 
them out according to ‘the standards an ideal, fully informed, rational, observer in the 
actual world would select as at least co-optimal for the cultivation of moral consid-
erations-responsive agency’ (Vargas 2013: 214). He also tells us that ‘the notion of 
contextual relevance will be settled by what is actually co-optimal or better for fos-
tering agency that recogni[s]es and suitably responds to moral considerations in the 
actual world, in ordinary contexts of action’ (Vargas 2013: 219, emphasis in origi-
nal). Similarly, ‘the suitable proportion of worlds will be that proportion—whichever 
it is—which is at least co-optimal for a practicable system of judgments, practices, and 
attitudes shaped by the aims of the responsibility system’ (Vargas 2013: 220–221). 
In other words, we must tailor our understanding of the similarity and proportional-
ity requirements in order to maximise the number of instances in which free will is 
ascribed to people who are likely to be positively influenced by blame, while mini-
mising the number of instances in which free will is ascribed to be people for whom 
a positive influence is unlikely. The repeated use of the adjective ‘co-optimal’ is pre-
sumably intended to capture the fact that different configurations of the proportional-
ity and similarity requirements may be combined to yield equally efficacious respon-
sibility judgments. For instance, if we conjoined a stringent similarity requirement 
with a loose proportionality requirement, our ascriptions of praise and blame could 
be effective in developing moral agency, say, 75% of the time. Similarly, a loose simi-
larity requirement conjoined with a stringent proportionality requirement might also 
produce effective results 75% of the time. If there were no possible configuration that 
were more efficacious, the above configurations would be co-optimal.
Of course, this talk of loose and stringent understandings is highly vague, and 
few would find Vargas’s account persuasive unless these requirements could be 
8 It should be noted that he does not construe free will as an all-or-nothing, acontextual property. For 
instance, an agent may have free will with respect to M in C1 but not in C2. One person may generally 
possess the free will to respond to M1 but not M2, while another may generally possess the free will to 
respond to M2 but not M1. Vargas intends this circumstantialist picture to distance his accounts from the 
atomistic (acontextual) and monistic (non-scalar, all-or-nothing) theories that predominate the reasons-
responsive literature. He claims that most reasons-responsive accounts are insufficiently attentive to the 
findings of situationist social psychology, which show that contextual factors have a far greater impact 
on human action than is ordinarily assumed. Although Vargas’s circumstantialism and his criticisms of 
traditional reasons-responsive accounts are important contributions to the responsibility literature, I shall 
have very little to say about them here (see Vargas 2013: 204–209).
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delineated with far greater specificity. It is therefore regrettable that he does not pro-
vide much more advice for the reader who wishes to add some meat to his skel-
etal framework. To be sure, he does provide some further advice. For instance, he 
cautions against an extremely fine-grained understanding of the relevance require-
ment whereby a context is germane only if it is identical to the real-world situation 
in which an agent acted. After all, if determinism were true and we adopted this 
understanding, then all relevant contexts would contain the same outcome as in the 
original situation. If S failed to respond to a moral consideration in the real world, he 
would also fail in all relevantly similar worlds. But this approach would be unpalat-
able. It would recommend that we never blame anyone for anything, thereby depriv-
ing us of all the benefits that blame can bring (Vargas 2013: 218–219).
Vargas also counsels against a capacious understanding of contextual relevance, 
which would generate too many false positives to warrant our endorsement. Such an 
understanding would make it exceedingly hard for even the most scrupulous peo-
ple to avoid being blamed frequently (Vargas 2013: 218–221). He makes similar 
remarks about the proportionality requirement, telling us, for example, that no one 
‘in the sublunary realm’ could respond to the relevant consideration(s) in all rel-
evant worlds, whilst everyone could in at least one world (Vargas 2013: 221–222). 
ACM thus requires ‘a Goldilocks notion of capacity: not too strict and not too lax, 
or, just right for enabling a well-functioning system of blame’ (Vargas 2018: 120).
3.2  Epistemic Redundancy and Conceptual Distortion
Vargas’s advice is quite unilluminating for those who want to concretise his con-
ception of free will. It is therefore surprising that few of his critics have trained 
their attention on it. Indeed, Vargas himself acknowledges that he offers ‘more of 
a recipe for a substantive conclusion than a bold, decisive answer’ (Vargas 2013: 
222). Let us follow his recipe and sample the results. Perhaps Vargas’s conception 
of responsible agency can be given more precision by pondering how his test should 
apply to various classes of individuals. Consider psychopaths, for example. Before 
he had published his counterfactual test, Vargas wrote a piece about the responsibil-
ity of psychopathic serial killers. In it he lists various hallmarks of psychopathy: 
poor impulse control resulting from observable brain abnormalities, lack of empathy 
and guilt, no aversion to violent imagery, and so on. Interestingly, psychopaths are 
unable to distinguish moral norms from mere conventions. They would see no quali-
tative difference between a prohibition on torturing babies and a restriction on the 
number of players in a game of football. Vargas notes that psychopaths are notori-
ously unresponsive to social pressures. They are blind to the moral valence of their 
acts, and their inability to feel shame or contrition makes them largely unresponsive 
to hostile attitudes (Vargas 2010: 70–73). Thus, ACM gives us little reason to hold 
them responsible. They are unlikely to internalise moral norms as a result of praise 
and blame. In Vargas’s words, ‘we ought not (morally) to blame psychopaths for 
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harming others. That means that psychopathic serial killers aren’t, properly speak-
ing, blameworthy for what they do’ (Vargas 2010: 74, endnote omitted).9
In light of this, Vargas would clearly want us to construe his counterfactual test in 
such a way that any psychopath who fails to respond to some moral consideration M 
would not have responded to M in a suitable proportion of relevantly similar worlds. 
This might allow us to say certain things about which worlds count as relevant. For 
instance, a world in which someone responds to M because he is no longer a psycho-
path would obviously be irrelevant. Similarly, if we assume kleptomania is not influ-
enced by blame, ACM would give us little reason to contemplate a world in which a 
thief is no longer a kleptomaniac. However, these restrictions on the counterfactual 
analysis are fairly unenlightening and it is unclear that Vargas gives us the means to 
say anything more significant. Moreover, the examples just adduced help to bring 
out the superfluity of his test. If we endorse ACM and we know that psychopaths 
are incorrigible, we can simply bypass Vargas’s abstruse test and adopt a norm of 
exempting psychopaths. The same applies mutatis mutandis to acts of kleptoma-
nia.10 This point can be generalised across any number of examples.
Consider, for instance, a schoolteacher who endorses ACM and wants to apply 
Vargas’s counterfactual test to various disruptive teenagers. After reading Build-
ing Better Beings, she finds herself confronted with a boisterous boy whose rowdy 
behaviour is intended to boost his reputation for rebellion. Noticing that he has 
failed to respond to the moral considerations against disturbing class, she must 
now ask whether he would have responded to them in a suitable portion of rel-
evantly similar worlds. Puzzled at how to answer this question, she revisits Var-
gas’s guidance. This reminds her that the proportionality and similarity require-
ments should be tailored to increase the probability that freedom is ascribed to 
wrongdoers who can be influenced positively by blame. She also remembers Var-
gas’s exhortation to avoid predicting the effects of praise and blame in any given 
case. Her interest should not be in whether blaming this boy would yield positive 
results but whether a general policy of blaming boys like him would do so.11 In 
order to apply the counterfactual test in this particular case, she must flesh out 
the proportionality and similarity requirements by reflecting on whether it is, on 
balance, useful to blame boisterous boys. While she cannot find much data on the 
matter, her experience suggests that chastisement normally works on such boys, 
9 In Building Better Beings, Vargas countenances ‘acquired psychopathy’ as a valid excuse, thereby tac-
itly reaffirming his view that psychopaths are exempt from blame (Vargas 2013: 278). However, this view 
does not sit well with his commodious notion of responsiveness to moral considerations. Even if psy-
chopaths lack moral sentiments, many are able to adjust their conduct in light of prudential concerns. It 
seems plausible to think that repeated exposure to negative stimuli (e.g. blame) could give at least some 
psychopaths an affective drive not to engage in wrongful conduct. According to ACM, this should make 
them moral agents. (While poor impulse control is a paradigmatic trait of psychopaths, it is not a neces-
sary trait. A high degree of prudence does not disqualify someone from being a psychopath—‘functional 
psychopath’ is not a contradiction in terms. If someone possesses most of the other paradigmatic features 
to a substantial extent, he will still qualify a psychopath.)
10 Assuming again that kleptomania—an underexplored condition—is not diminished by blame.
11 ‘On the account that I propose, whether the agent is morally responsible for his or her actions is not 
a function of a particular agent’s susceptibility to influence in that particular circumstance, but rather a 
function of what the justified norms of moral influence say about the status of responsible agents in those 
contexts’ (Vargas 2013: 103).
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perhaps because it makes them feel like fools in the eyes of their peers. She there-
fore resolves to construe the test accordingly: whenever faced with a boisterous 
boy, she will fix the requirements to yield the conclusion that he would not dis-
rupt class in an appropriate number of germane worlds. In contrast, she believes 
that reprobation only exacerbates the misbehaviour of pupils with ‘rotten social 
backgrounds’ by heightening their sense of disenfranchisement. As a result, she 
concludes that any such pupil would not act differently in enough worlds to qual-
ify as a responsible agent.
These reflections should leave one wondering what purpose the counterfactual 
test really serves. It is initially framed as a means of guiding our assignments of 
blame. We should only blame Jones, Vargas tells us, if we are convinced that he 
would have behaved differently in apposite circumstances. But we cannot determine 
how Jones would have behaved in the relevant circumstances until we have decided 
whether it is good policy to blame similar people for similar wrongdoings. If we 
have not settled this matter, we will not be able to give any determinate meaning 
to the relevant counterfactual requirements. However, once the matter is settled, we 
will be left with no reason to engage in any counterfactual reasoning. If it is good 
policy to blame people like Jones, ACM will permit us to go ahead and hold them 
responsible. The work necessary to give the counterfactual test meaning makes that 
very test redundant. Once we know that people like Jones are susceptible to blame, 
there is no need to agonise about how he might have behaved in various alternate 
universes. We do not have to sift through a multitude of hypothetical cases, assess-
ing them for relevance and dividing them according to whether the desired behav-
iour occurred. To use another example, suppose that reprimanding religious bigots 
has desirable effects. If this is so, we can be certain that the test will ascribe free 
will to a run-of-the-mill religious bigot before any straining of the imagination has 
occurred. In contrast, if alcoholics respond negatively to blame, we know they will 
not satisfy the test.
Vargas’s notion of free will, it turns out, resembles the whistle on an engine—
while it may seem to make us blameworthy, it is actually our blameworthiness that 
makes us free. Whenever we have good forward-looking reasons to deem some class 
of wrongdoers blameworthy, Vargas instructs us to ascribe free will to its members 
and speak as though their freedom made them blameworthy all along. But contrary 
to appearances, questions of free will are actually settled by questions about the 
propriety of the reactive attitudes, rather than the other way around. A wrongdoer’s 
blameworthiness is logically prior to his free will: we must decide whether it is good 
policy to blame him before we can ascribe counterfactual freedom to him. Indeed, 
the statement that he has free will is apparently just a roundabout way of saying that 
ACM gives us good (freedom-independent) reasons to hold him responsible. But 
this makes counterfactual freedom both meaningless and useless. If freedom simply 
means belonging to a group of people whom it is good policy to blame, it is not 
really freedom in any recognisable sense of the term. Moreover, since we must settle 
the relevant policy questions in advance of applying the counterfactual test, there is 
no clear sense as to how the test is supposed to aid us. In short, if we embrace ACM, 
enquiries into an agent’s counterfactual freedom will become superfluous when con-
sidering the ethics of holding him responsible.
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What has led Vargas to invert the relation between freedom and responsibility in 
this way? The answer lies in his desire to achieve two quite disparate goals. First, 
as has already been emphasised, he wants to tailor his metaphysics to his teleology. 
Second, he seeks to preserve the ostensible folk commitment that moral responsibil-
ity requires the ability to do otherwise. To understand this second goal, it will be 
helpful to reflect briefly on an aspect of Vargas’s methodology that we have not yet 
covered. Vargas believes that the folk concept of responsibility is implicitly liber-
tarian but that the agential powers posited by libertarians are metaphysically and 
scientifically implausible (Vargas 2013: ch 1, ch 2). However, he does not want to 
jettison the folk concept of responsibility altogether. Rather, he embraces a position 
of ‘philosophical conservation’ according to which ‘we ought to abandon our stand-
ing commitments only as a last resort’ (Vargas 2013: 73). Thus, Vargas prefers a 
revisionist position that seeks merely to modify moral conventions in light of deeper 
moral concerns (Vargas 2013: ch 3).12
It should be noted that there is not really anything philosophical about Vargas’s 
conservation principle—it is in fact entirely pragmatic (in the non-philosophical 
sense). The principle is not based on the view that folk convictions are prima facie 
credible. Nor does it have the epistemic goal of bringing us closer to truth. Rather, it 
appeals entirely to the social costs involved in substantial alterations to conventional 
morality. Because our minds are ‘cognitively finite systems with limited resources’, 
it is enormously taxing to initiate vast changes in what we believe and how we 
behave. Concerning our beliefs, Vargas writes that ‘the larger the revision, the more 
general doxastic stability is threatened and the larger the tear will be in the fabric of 
interlocking justification and explanation that ordinarily develops among our beliefs’ 
(Vargas 2013: 74). Regarding behaviour, he asserts that ‘in cases where the relevant 
beliefs are intimately connected with practical matters, where those beliefs struc-
ture our practices and interactions, the costs of belief revision are particularly high 
because revision disrupts entrenched dispositions of action and patterns of conduct’ 
(Vargas 2013: 74). This may be good advice for policymakers, but calling it philo-
sophical conceals its intent. Vargas’s principle does not speak to philosophers con-
cerned about what we should do but to practical people concerned about the most 
we can expect people to do. This is rather like the posture of an environmental cam-
paigner who does not call for a complete overhaul of our practices because such 
high demands would overwhelm many people into complete inaction. While this 
orientation is no doubt laudable, it is a key source of Vargas’s conceptual distortion.
Vargas thinks that modern Westerners possess untenable libertarian commit-
ments, but he wants to offer them a way to preserve the idea that blame requires 
the ability to do otherwise (albeit in a non-libertarian sense). He claims that his 
account ‘permits us to make sense of the idea that (at least sometimes) agents can 
do otherwise when acting’ and ‘provides a way to accommodate the familiar thought 
that there are responsibility-significant possibilities regarding what could have hap-
pened, but did not’ (Vargas 2013: 230). Given Vargas’s concern about our cognitive 
12 While Vargas offers a rich discussion of revisionism and the various forms it may take, there is no 
need to recapitulate it here.
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limitations, it is ironic that he prescribes an abstruse counterfactual test to guide 
everyday ascriptions of responsibility. Equally troubling, however, is that his con-
strual of the counterfactual test calls for a much more profound shift in folk thinking 
than he recognises. On Vargas’s understanding, whenever S has failed to respond to 
M in C, the statement ‘S would have responded to M in C in a suitable proportion 
of relevantly similar worlds’ is really a convoluted way of saying something like 
‘blaming people such as S helps indispose them toward future misconduct’. As pre-
viously noted, if ACM gives us good reasons to blame a class of people, we are told 
to ascribe certain metaphysical properties to members of that class and then claim 
that our reasons emanated from those metaphysical properties all along. Thus, con-
trary to what nearly everyone thinks, free will is no longer a prerequisite of justified 
blame; justified blame is in fact a prerequisite of free will. Anyone who fully appre-
ciates Vargas’s tortuous counterfactual test will regard it as a quagmire of evasion at 
best or a wretched subterfuge at worst.
4  Concluding Remarks
The ostensible superiority of Vargas’s account is sustained by the putative contrast 
between ACM’s focus on moral agency and MIT’s focus on being disposed to act 
morally. However, I have argued that his conception of agency is so expansive that 
it cannot be distinguished from a disposition to behave in a morally desirable man-
ner. ACM retains all of MIT’s shortcomings because it just is MIT under a differ-
ent name. Vargas could always adopt a more refined account of moral agency, but 
doing so would increase the evidential burden on his empirical claims about how the 
reactive attitudes influence us. While his counterfactual test is intended to preserve 
folk views about the relationship between freedom and responsibility, it ends up dis-
torting them by tacitly making questions of just blame logically prior to questions 
of free will. This distortion results from an attempt to tailor his metaphysics to his 
ethics while preserving the everyday intuition that alternative possibilities are neces-
sary for freedom. Regrettably, the pursuit of two divergent goals has resulted in the 
achievement of neither.
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